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Abstract
In this speculative philosophical article, I consider what sense of educational ethics emerges 
under certain purposes in education. The philosopher of education, Gert Biesta, has noted 
that education always involves someone educating someone else with a certain purpose in 
mind toward a certain end. What we mean by “the ethical” in education no doubt depends 
upon what we assume the ends and purposes of education are. Tapping into Biesta’s 
tripartite understanding of the purposes of education, my article begins by discussing the 
two most commonly assumed ends of education, “qualification” and “socialization,” and the 
ethical limits within their approaches. I then move to consider the significance of a third 
educational purpose, one which has become less commonly invoked (even disparaged and 
wholly dismissed) in current educational discourse. However, while Biesta calls this third 
educational end “subjectification,” I in turn call this aim “becoming-singular-plural.” I do so 
in order to emphasize the primacy of “relationality” at stake in an education that seeks to 
foster our sense of being uniquely and singularly charged with responding to a 
transgenerational relationship to the world. In the last part of the article, I go on to discuss 
how the educational concern with “becoming-singular-plural” necessarily unleashes an 
ethical transgenerational thinking and attentiveness to “passing time together.” This ethical 
transgenerational thinking, I discuss, stands in sharp contrast to the narrow sense of ethics 
implied within the aims of “qualification” and “socialization,” and to our present time of 
“learnification,” when the ubiquitous pursuit of qualification (as a frantic concern with my 
sole survival and my own success) has become itself a dominant form of socialization. At 
stake, is the recovery of a more expansive sense of educational ethics that stands in 
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relation to those no longer here who hand us a world to take care of, and to those not yet 
present who will one day receive the world we are tending.
Introduction 
The question in the title of my article – ethical education? – suggests that there is 
something suspicious about simply linking ethics with education. And rightly so, for 
without the question mark we would have a declarative statement that would be too self-
assured, triumphantly assuming education’s mastery over “the ethical.” This article would 
have a very different approach to the discussion if it was entitled ethical education period, 
or ethical education exclamation mark. Invoking ethics-and-education without any 
hesitation or in a celebratory tone could ready us to commit “the worst.” Indeed, I believe 
that we would agree that in the name of education and under the guise of what claims to be 
ethical (through our overconfidence in adhering to rules or pining after virtue) many 
wrongs have been committed. Consequently, the significance of placing the question here 
is to initially prompt our suspicion about how we justify our moral norms, thus helping us 
to scrutinize the worst self-assurances and any bonne conscience that co-joining the terms 
“ethics” and “education” might lead us toward.
But, nevertheless, there is still a promise that ushers forth from this question: a promise to 
recover a sense of “the ethical” that is different from the one that a moral genealogist like 
Nietzsche would scrutinize. For, after all, in the very suspicion, hesitation and questioning 
of what goes by the term “ethical education” there is an ethical sensibility at work. We 
could insist – and, I think we should do so – that the very suspicion implicit in our question, 
our very suspicion of what claims to be ethical, is actually showcasing a form of ethical 
thinking at work. So, this type of thinking (which is vigilant, hesitates and turns our 
declaratives into questions) offers us an ethics against ethics,1 a thinking that hopefully 
neither engenders nor triumphally justifies our self-assurances or moral convictions in 
what we deem to be education. 
In what follows, I implicitly oscillate between the suspicion and the promise of the question 
of ethics and education to muse about what sense of ethics (what sense of care and 
attentiveness) emerges under certain educational purposes. Gert Biesta has noted that 
education always involves someone educating someone else with a certain purpose in mind 
toward a certain end.2 Our sense of what is meant by “the ethical” in education will no 
doubt depend upon what we assume the ends and purposes of education are thought to be. 
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Tapping into Biesta’s tripartite understanding of the purposes of education I’ll begin by 
discussing the two most commonly assumed ends of education, “qualification” and 
“socialization,”3 and the limits of their respective ethical approach (on the one hand 
procedural, on the other, substantive), which they put into play. I then move to consider the 
significance of a third educational purpose, one which is less commonly invoked in current 
educational discourse. However, while Biesta calls this third educational end 
“subjectification,” I in turn name this aim, “becoming-singular-plural.” I do so in order to 
emphasize the primacy of “relationality” at stake in an education that seeks to foster our 
sense of being uniquely-singularly-charged to respond to a transgenerational relationship. 
Such a transgenerational relationship, as I will point out, is a fundamentally responsive 
relationship. It responds to those no longer here who hand us a world, and to those not yet 
present who will one day receive the world that we tended. In the remaining part of the 
article I go on to discuss how the educational concern with “becoming-singular-plural” 
necessarily unleashes an ethical thinking and attentiveness to “passing time together,” 
which stands in sharp contrast to the ethics implied within the aims of “qualification” and 
“socialization.”
Qualification, socialization and “becoming-singular-plural”
The pursuit of “qualification” is an end towards which education is commonly assumed 
to be striving. Driven by the purpose of qualification, education is primarily understood as 
the delivery and acquisition of knowledge and skills that would render one measurably 
competent in a specific area. Under this purpose, ethical concerns (if they can still be called 
that) are purely procedural and are limited to the level of administrating rules for 
determining qualification. Ethics, in this sense, usually means ensuring the application of 
value-free standards for evaluating the effectiveness of delivering or acquiring a set of pre-
defined skills that will afford learners the basis and confidence to secure their success in a 
future good life, for example, a career.
In this rather thin manner of co-joining ethics with education a particular learner or subject 
of learning is prompted. This subject is invited to constantly innovate and improve herself 
or himself through learning and evermore learning. Drawing on Lauren Berlant’s term, a 
“cruel optimism”4 in learning takes hold as the subject is driven to value education as a 
means of managing and mortgaging her own success by securing ever more qualifications 
to find or hold onto that ideal job. The apparently benign “value-free” discourse of “life-
long learning,” for example, is peddled under the guise that amidst today’s constantly 
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changing circumstances, individuals, in order to succeed in their jobs, need to learn how to 
constantly learn regardless of the content. Emphasizing learning as a transposable mode 
that can meet any situation promises that our ability to constantly learn will allow us to 
acquire whatever qualifications we might need to adapt to (and survive) an ever volatile 
and menacing market. The cruel paradox here is that under “late capitalism” this optimism 
in learning quite literally indebts us to an impossible normative narrative of success. All 
such optimistic gesticulations and solicitations ultimately wear us down and lock us down, 
as it were, within the privative principle that tells us that it is all up to the individual to 
innovate and improve, and to keep innovating and improving herself through learning and 
attaining ever more qualifications. Putting the burden of such optimism on the individual 
consequently alienates and isolates one from what it might mean to co-exist with one 
another and to undertake a more worldlier sense of education that goes beyond the 
concern with one’s mere survival.
Caught in the endless pursuit of self-improvement and of managing oneself for success in 
the job market, we admittedly end up losing not only something of ourselves, but also 
something worldly and fundamental about education itself. The cruel irony here is that this 
optimism in education ends up usurping what is “educational” in education. Today’s 
optimism in education, with its emphasis on “answering everything there is to say about 
education in terms of individual learners” and how processes of learning can secure 
personal success, leads to the “learnification of education.” According to Biesta, this term 
signals a time when “the language of learning makes it difficult if not impossible” to speak 
about the substantive purposes of education,5 and the role that education plays (or should 
play) in tending to and forging a common world beyond the economy of survival. This 
emphasis on “learning” and qualification, which narrows ethics to procedures for ensuring 
one’s success, basically emphasizes the individual in isolation and also accents 
instrumental self-serving approaches over existential and interpretative world-building 
endeavours.
In another end, education is also commonly thought to teach for “social reproduction” 
and “socialization.” There are many variations on how an education should undertake to 
reproduce society, some of them with very noxious assumptions and manifestations (I’m 
thinking here of residential schools in Canada, among many other experiences). However, 
the relatively recent interest in how education is vested with cultivating values and critical 
capacities to reproduce democratic society and tradition, stands out as an exemplary 
approach. For example, Martha Nussbaum champions an education that draws from 
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representative texts and figures (characters and situations encountered in and through 
literature and philosophy) to cultivate moral dispositions for self-reflection, empathy, 
compassion, dialogue and reason. According to her, such representations and figures offer 
“ethical” models for us to contemplate, which are essential for consciously reproducing a 
democratic society based on deliberation and mutual respect. As she puts it, we ask 
“education to contribute a general preparation for citizenship, not just specialized 
preparation for a career… to extend the benefits of this education to all citizens, whatever 
their class, race, sex, ethnicity, or religion.” She goes on to note that through education 
“we hope to draw citizens toward one another by complex mutual understanding and 
individual self-scrutiny, building a democratic culture that is truly deliberative and 
reflective, rather than simply the collision of unexamined prejudices.”6 The ethical, in 
Nussbaum’s sense, would thus involve us in rationally committing to and reproducing 
democratic norms, desirable characteristics and civic virtues that we can come to know 
through our critical capacities for deliberation and through our immersion in a culturally 
expansive cosmopolitan repertoire. Facing contrasting ideas in the classroom or in texts 
and having to rationally justify and test our own claims and intuitions alongside others 
consequently nurtures in us a way of living with others in mutual (rational) respect. Such 
an education would help us to consciously commit to reproducing the project of sustaining 
an ever-growing plurality that is evermore essential for a democratic society in a 
cosmopolitan world.  
The concern, like Nussbaum’s, for how education might reproduce a democratic ethos is 
laudable enough. Yet, it is important to note that social reproduction inevitably implies 
fitting or making newcomers (the child-student) adapt to an already existing (structured) 
social order with all its problems, limitations and exclusions. Education’s imbrication with 
the aim of social reproduction is thus always to some extent politically driven, orienting 
society in a certain direction over another, consequently drawing lines of inclusion and 
exclusions in particular ways. Those arguing from the deliberative democracy perspective 
might respond that fostering the skills and capacity for empathy, compassion and critical 
dialogue (liberal virtues) in students will allow for conscious (rational) social reproduction, 
thus averting any straightforward insertion of newcomers into existing ways of doing and 
thinking that would replicate the exclusions of the status-quo. However, having faith in the 
universal desirability and neutrality of deliberation (alongside liberal virtues) already 
assumes a particular order of being, doing and thinking (though unacknowledged) to which 
subjects must commit at the risk of exclusion. Deliberation and its accompanying virtues 
are simply presented as a logical necessity that no one invested in the process of democratic 
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social reproduction would reasonably deny. This account admittedly disregards the moment 
of closure and exclusion in which a political decision to re/produce a particular type of 
subjectivity and social order takes shape, thereby dodging political questions, such as 
regarding the specific orientations and decisions taken that could have been otherwise. 
The third purpose of education, the one that I will more fully engage in the rest of the 
ar ticle,  is admittedly rather elusive and has to do with what Biesta terms 
“subjectification,”7 or, what I choose to call (drawing from another lexicon) “becoming-
singular-plural.”8 This involves the ways in which education contributes to the formation 
of a certain sense and sensibility for a person to become-singular-plural, that is, for a person 
to become uniquely-singularly-charged in relationship to others and the world.9 In contrast 
to cultivating desirable skills and characteristics for one’s own success and/or to reproduce 
a certain vision of society, education here has to do with the allotment of a time and place 
in which the singularity, irreplaceability and particularity of each person can emerge as 
they find themselves in a responsive relationship to a transgenerational covenant that is 
charged with tending the world. To be clear the sense of singularity prioritized here 
emerges not from acquiring skills or by cultivating civic virtues, but by becoming 
responsible to the call of the other (“whether already dead or not yet born”)10 and to the 
world that the other opens for me. Education, I want to propose, is thus, the place and time 
in which we can sense our exposure to the other and to a world that calls me out in a 
singular way: calls me out to attend to what is at risk of being lost, to what needs my 
tending, my mending and my time. Education in this sense invites each one of us to 
become existentially unique through our attempt to respond, to turn towards and to care 
for the world to which it introduces us: a world that is precarious, that wears down and is 
in need of tending, repair and renewal, as Hannah Arendt would say. When education is 
thought in terms of what contributes to our “becoming-singular-plural” (to our becoming 
uniquely-charged through our relation to others and the world) an ethical thinking and 
attentiveness is unleashed that stands in sharp contrast to the sense of ethics implied 
through the purposes of “qualification” and “socialization.”11
The ethical thinking and attentiveness unleashed when we attune ourselves to this other 
end in education consequently urges us to be suspicious of prioritizing the purposes of 
“qualification” and/or “socialization.” It would raise concerns for how our sense of 
becoming and responsibility for the world gets enframed and foreclosed when education 
privileges training or socialization: when the educational gets reduced to procedures and 
outcomes to be optimized for individual success or to substantive norms or standards to be 
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reproduced. 
I want to propose that in contrast to approaching what the ethical might mean to education 
through the ends of attaining “qualification” and/or “socialization,” an education that seeks 
to contribute to our “becoming-singular-plural” requires an ethical attentiveness to our 
being-with and amidst the always more of the world (alterity). Indeed, as the educational 
thinker Roger Simon once noted, education is educational when it exposes us to an 
unknowability that exceeds my grasp and cognitive categories, “for only that which I think 
not, which I am not already capable of speaking of, only that which does not repeat the 
Same, can break open my present and teach me, can give me the possibility of responding 
anew to its solicitation.”12 Ethical thinking in this sense not only would attune us to the 
unknowability that cuts through our coming together as teachers and students, but also 
would attune us to respect the implicit unknowability (the more than I can know or can 
grasp) that is inherit in receiving and passing on the world: a world that survives and has 
significance because it transcends the understandings and life-span of any one generation. 
Education is thus the place where we inherit and learn to “pass-on” the world, not simply 
as bits of knowledge or information that I grasp to serve myself and my time, but with an 
expansive sense of responsibility. Such a sense of responsibility uniquely falls upon us for 
guarding the traces left behind by those no longer here but who have nonetheless handed 
us a world, and for preserving a place-to-come for those not yet present who will one day 
receive the world we tended. In what follows below I discuss the above noted ethical 
thinking that is put into play, looking specifically at the educational imbrication with the 
transgenerational sense of “passing-on” and education’s implication with “worldly 
immortality.”
The educational ethics of “passing-on”
Education, at a very basic level, strives to assure the continuation of a common world, 
“passing on” from generation to generation an interpretative repertoire that can sustain 
and expand our sense of belonging to a world of significance. By virtue of “passing on” and 
giving to others what has already been received, education seems to offer a place for a type 
of “organized remembrance” or “inheritance.”13 The remembrance and inheritance that 
take place in education, however, are never consolidated or finally stored away. Rather, 
remembrance and inheritance become educational precisely when what is being 
remembered and inherited is restated and re-signified in a different context. In other 
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words, given that the process of transmission (as paradosis or as giving over) is enacted 
through language, what is “passed on” through education is necessarily open to varying 
interpretations, recitations and transformations: hence, to the possibility of iteration. In 
this sense, what is “educational” in education (what truly teaches us) involves engaging 
the past and the present with “something more” than itself, with something hopeful, with a 
transgenerational interpretive practice that implicates our time with the fact that for it to 
meaningfully survive we must “pass on” – that we in turn iterate, rather than merely repeat 
the Same.  
Our present must “pass on” (in all senses of the word); that is, our present must inherit 
the past (as something readable and transformable) to pass it on, and, at the same time, 
prepare for its own passing, in which it itself is handed over to the unpredictable birth of 
another.14  Here, education bears a remarkable affinity to how life inevitably passes 
something of the past on to the future, at the same time that it “passes on” or dies for the 
sake of the future. Moreover, beyond tending to what bridges generations across the abyss 
of birth and death, education also binds us together in the very moment of its passing-on. 
In other words, we have to appreciate that at a very basic level education is constituted by 
the flow of our passing time together. That is, that through an education we become, 
together, temporal. Education is where we literally pass the time together (in all senses of 
the term). We hang-out for hours a week, we make time for each other and together we 
spend our time working through common material, giving time to what is not here – to the 
past and to the future. And our passing time together through an education enables us to 
possibly feel our fleeting togetherness and its significance, and so share in the sensibility 
and chance of saying: yes, “we” are together in this world right now passing time. And in 
saying so, and in saying so many things by our passing time together, we might come to 
feel a bond to each other and to the world that outlasts even death, that gives us a surplus, 
a dividend, a something more, an “over-life” that would exceed the cruelty of merely 
serving necessity.15
Education as a place, perhaps the place, chiefly vested and concerned with “passing on” 
does not (thankfully) strive to teach us how to live (finally) or, even, how to die (finally). 
Rather, as an exemplary place of “passing-on,” education invites us to affirm the “living-
on” of the ethical question of what it might mean to live together: to forge, sustain and 
pledge something of significance in common (across generations and beyond my time) 
amidst what is constantly passing away: against the ruin of time. 
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Drawing on Jacques Derrida’s notion of “survival,” we could say that education, concerned 
as it is with the possibility of “passing on,” gives us a chance to affirm the idea of our world 
and our love for the world as surviving, as “living-after-death” and in excess of death.16 
Education, because it allows us the possibility to become concerned with what it means to 
“pass on,” seems to bring us together in a peculiar type of hopeful ethical affiliation that, 
borrowing from Derrida again, is forged on the “anterior affirmation of being-together in 
allocution.”17 This affiliation is forged not through familiarity or through any straightforward 
will but through finding ourselves already charged and called out to accept our implication 
with “passing on.” That is, we have here an affiliation forged across different times – before 
and after my time – during which each generation stands apart from all others but is still 
charged (like all others) with maintaining the hope of a common world to pass-on. This 
“charge,” this feeling of “allocution” that the world might “live-on” after all, forges an 
affiliation (a covenant) that is “infinitely larger and more powerful” than any one present: it 
thus allows us to sense what might be other than ourselves, a “plus que vie,” a “something 
more,” that hopefully and thankfully can survive me.  
However, our “present optimism” in learning, driven as it is by the logic of “learnification,” 
knows not how to ethically think of the “educational” as something that necessarily points 
beyond the present to “something more.” The cruelty of our present optimism in learning, 
I want to suggest, is precisely cruel because it is not hopeful; it is cruel because it self-
encloses education in the fears and delimitations of a present that has no sense of its 
implication with the larger transgenerational significance of affirming our “passing on,” or 
of even valuing the simple fact of our passing time together. That is, under our “present 
optimism” in “learnification,” education gets locked into and becomes exclusively defined 
by the present short-term impulse to acquire qualifications, knowledge and skills that 
would allow the individual “to make it” in the fierce atmosphere of today’s job market. The 
fleeting, privative and self-serving optimism of our time renders education temporally 
insignificant and ultimately alienated from a sense of having anything to do with sustaining 
something larger and more durable than our immediate interests. Education, thought of 
today as simply the pursuit of qualifications (as the acquisition of knowledge and skills that 
would render one measurably competent to perform a specific task), does not tend to the 
world and its vastness (its history), but rather serves the limited, short time (the 
individual’s lifespan) of the optimistic job seeker. 
Education as an optimistic pursuit for “self-betterment” thus gets caught up in and is 
primarily defined as a “process” that vows to equip individuals with the skills for adapting 
－ 283 －
Ethical Education? Recovering the sense of a transgenerational and worldly ethics in education
to the cyclical activity of sustaining our individual “survival” and “mere life.” The prevalent 
sense of learning motored as it is by the optimism of creating individuals that can be ever-
more flexible and efficient, who can ceaselessly adapt and innovate to the needs of life 
under “late capitalism,” risks completely occluding public and durable (trans-generational) 
questions regarding what education might or should be for. Instead of asking after “who are 
we” and “who will we become,” through this pervasive sense of education, we end up with 
a purposeless notion of the learner as a perpetual opportunist. In this sense, we relinquish 
that education, or a person undergoing an education, should be committed to any long-term 
common undertakings. Even the antiquated and often problematic myths surrounding 
education’s role in nation building, progress or social reproduction through rational 
deliberation, which once promised a kind of “common” trans-generational cohesion, seem 
to no longer hold sway.
Today’s optimism in undergoing an education seems to exclusively serve the present 
interest of securing individual success above all else; such a “cruel optimism” in education 
symptomatically reflects, in Berlant’s words, “the strategies of survival and adjustment we 
have developed for living in the present.”18 To press Berlant’s point, survival can only 
mean adjusting one’s optimum place in the world as it presently is, as it can only be by 
necessity, that is, with no concern for the “over-life” or for what Derrida terms 
“survivance,” the “something more” that outlasts death. 
Utilizing education to optimize the individual’s survival and adjustment to his or her 
immediate circumstances has to do with the serious business of learning to adjust to an 
environment in which life seems to be under perpetual threat (where one fears the threat 
of one’s job, of not being competitive, of not keeping up with one’s colleagues). This 
emphasis on learning (for securing “my survival” and “my success”) renders absurd our 
finding any significance in simply passing time through an education. What risks becoming 
completely trivial and almost un-communicable here is that feeling that arises when we 
pass time through an education: that sense that through an education we can become 
bounded together, temporally, to something more than what is here and now and for me, 
something which I do not have, nor can I simply give myself, something that emerges 
when we love things together that are other than for myself: in a word, the “world,” at 
least in Hannah Arendt’s sense of it.     
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Education and the ethics of worldly immortality
To counter the cruel educational optimism of our time necessitates our breaking out of the 
trappings of a self-enclosed present and tapping into the “plus que vie,” the something 
more in excess of death; to this end, we need to consider an ethical sense in education that 
ultimately has to do with that which, in the words of Arendt, “transcends the lifespan of 
mortal men”19 We need to consider that what is truly “educational” in education involves a 
concern and ethical reckoning with “immortality.”20 There is nothing theological or 
otherworldly about this claim. Education is concerned with the immortal since education is 
a means in which the world ensures its continuity, and in which “things are saved from the 
destruction of time.”21 If education is to have any ethical meaning (any relational worldly 
sense) it cannot simply be erected for one generation and only of concern for the optimism 
and short-term interests of those presently living. What is educational must outlast and 
exceed our own lifespan and reach into the past and future alike, since it involves tending 
to something that was there before we came into the world and something that will 
presumably, hopefully, outlast our brief appearance in it. While ultimately nothing human 
will be able to withstand the ruin and wearing down of time, education provides a place 
where we can maintain and give shelter to something that sustains the hope and 
affirmation of nevertheless “living-on” with significance. In other words, education gives 
us a place that can shelter a repertoire of common visions and aspirations that can be 
brought into meaningful configurations culled from the meaningful patterns of the past to 
help us tend, mend and repair a world that wears down. 
Linking education and worldly immortality, with that which spans beyond any one lifespan 
or any one-generation, allows us to tap into an ethical way of thinking that is “hopeful” 
rather than fleetingly optimistic. A transgenerational ethical hope arises for us when we 
consider that what we might build and tend to through an education is not merely confined 
to our own individual, short lifespans but surpasses our transient existences and can 
become part of a larger world. Thinking of education in this way, tending to an ethical 
transgenerational sense of education as that which lies beyond the optimism of my own 
lone success, helps, it would seem, to guard against the fleetingness and meaninglessness 
of individual life. What is educational in education, that is, what offers an ethical approach 
to education, exceeds “my time” and helps to give meaning and hope to a person’s 
existence beyond the perishable and temporally insignificant ego. It thus helps us to “pass 
on.” In other words, what is educational initiates us into a common world that uniquely and 
singularly involves me, charges me, but thankfully is more than me or just for me and my 
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time.
Because this ethical sense of education points beyond my needs and my short-term 
interests it saves me from the cruel depravity of isolation and offers me the hope of being 
part of a world. This involves the ways in which education contributes to the formation of a 
certain sense and sensibility for a person to “become-singular-plural,” that is, for a person 
to become uniquely-singularly-charged in relationship to a world that others across time 
have tended and that requires its passing on. Education thus has to do with the allotment 
of a time and place where the singularity, irreplaceability and particularity of each person 
can emerge through being in a responsive transgenerational relationship to others and the 
world: to a sense of worldly sur-vivance forged by our “being-together in allocution,”22 our 
feeling bounded to one another across time through our being “charged” to take care of the 
world.
The sense of singularity prioritized here emerges not from actualizing one’s own potential 
for learning, or in acquiring habits-of-mind for deliberation or even by cultivating civic 
virtues in the self, but by finding our-selves already responsible – finding our-selves 
relationally “impinged,” “charged” in “allocution” – to the transgenerational call and pull of 
the world. At issue here is an ethical way of engaging with the purpose of education which 
does not simply appreciate that our own becoming through an education always takes place 
in what already has begun (in what has already been passed to us). Rather, our “becoming” 
becomes precisely “singular,” and hence an educational event, when my being (which is 
already in relation to other beings) senses its unique charge with tending to that which is 
passing-away and with tending to the fragility of the world that needs my time and 
attention for it to “pass on.”
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倫理教育？教育における世代を超えた
世俗的な倫理観の回復
マリオ・ディ・パオラントニオ
　この思索的な哲学的論文において、私は教育における特定の目的の下で、どのよう
な教育倫理観が現れるのかを考察する。教育哲学者の Gert Biesta は、教育は常にあ
る目的を心に抱いてある目標へと他の誰かを教育することを伴うと指摘している。教
育における「倫理的なこと」という言葉によって私たちが意味することは、教育の目
標と目的が何であるかによって決まることは間違いない。本稿では、Biesta の教育目
的に関する 3 つの理解に触れながら、もっとも一般的に想定される 2 つの教育目的
である「資格認定」と「社会化」について、それらのアプローチに内在する倫理的限
界について検討することから始める。それから私は第 3 の教育目的の重要性を検討
するが、それは現代の教育言説において概して唱えられなくなってきている（軽んじ
られ、完全に捨象されてさえいる）ものである。Biesta はこの第 3 の教育目標を「主
観化」と呼んでいるが、私はこの目標を「単数の複数化」と呼ぶ。私は、世界との世
代を超えた関係に応えることに独特の責任を負うという感覚を育てる教育において、
「関係性」が危機にあるということの最重要性を強調している。論文の最終部におい
ては、いかに「単数の複数化」という教育上の関心が、「現在共にあること」のために、
倫理的に世代を超えた思考と注目を必然的に招くのかについて論じている。この倫理
的な世代を超えた思考は、（私個人の生存と私自身の成功への必死な関心としての）
資格認定の普遍的な追求それ自体が社会化の支配的な形態となっているときに、「資
格認定」と「社会化」という目的のなかで暗示されている狭い倫理観や、現在の「学
習化」とするどく対比するものとして位置している。危機にあるのは、担ってきた世
界を私たちに譲り渡しているもうここに存在しない人々、および私たちが現在担って
いる世界を受け取るであろうまだ存在しない人々との関連において確立しているより
広範な教育倫理観の回復である。
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